INTRODUCTION
As information is widely shared and frequently exchanged in the big-data era, data-owners' fear of privacy breach continues to escalate. For instance, 78% smartphone users among 180 participants in a survey [11] believe that apps accessing their location pose privacy threats. On the other hand, data collected from individual users can be of great value for both academic research and society, e.g. for purposes like data mining or social studies. To release such data, private information must be retained. As a result, private data release has drawn increasing research interest.
Markov model has been extensively used as a standard data model. For example, to analyze the web navigation behavior of users, the transitions between web-pages can be described through Markov model [5] ; to analyze the moving Released data:
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Figure 1: Private data release mechanism embedded in HMM patterns of users, Markov model (e.g., in Figure 3a a user moves among 6 locations) is also commonly adopted [25, 12] .
To preserve the privacy in Markov model, the true state (e.g. the true webpage the user is browsing or the true location of a moving user) must be protected before the data is used or released.
In this paper, we study the problem of private data release in Markov model. First, the true state that changes by Markov transition should be hidden from (not observable to) adversaries. Hence it is an HMM. Second, different from the traditional HMM where the emission probabilities governing the distribution of the observed variables are given, we embed a private data release mechanism in HMM to determine the emission probabilities for privacy protection. Given a function of the state, our goal is to release the answer of the function with the private data release mechanism at each timestamp. Figure 1 shows our problem.
To design the private data release mechanism, there are two major difficulties.
• How to tune the trade-off between privacy and utility with customizable privacy policy? Most privacy notions in the literature only work in their specific problem settings, and lack the flexibility of trading-off privacy and utility. The state-of-art Blowfish framework [16] , however, was proposed in the statistical database context, and cannot be directly adopted in Markov model.
• How to design a privacy notion under the temporal correlations in Markov model? Because most privacy notions proposed so far only focus on privacy models in static scenarios, they are vulnerable against inference attacks with temporal correlations in Markov model. several challenges emerge when adapting Blowfish framework in Markov model.
Blowfish Privacy. Customizable privacy framework, Blowfish privacy [16, 19] , has been studied in statistical database context. To tune the privacy and utility, it uses a policy graph where a node represents a secret, and an edge represents indistinguishability between the two connected nodes. For example, Figure 2a is a patients' table where each row is a secret indicating the patient's disease e.g., secrets s3 and s4 are "Bob has cancer" and "Bob has diabetes" respectively. For bounded Blowfish privacy, it uses a policy graph to enforce the indistinguishability between the secrets, which can be regarded as edge protection in the graph. For instance, Figure 2b ensures adversaries cannot distinguish whether Bob has cancer or diabetes by connecting s3 and s4. For unbounded Blowfish privacy, it uses a policy graph to disguise the existence of secrets. For example, Figure 2c connects all secrets to a "null" node, which represents the nonexistence of these nodes. Thus the adversaries cannot know whether a secret is real or not. Furthermore, the bounded and unbounded Blowfish privacies can also be combined in one graph by adding the null node into the graph of bounded Blowfish.
Although the privacy customization of Blowfish is intuitive, the overall protection of Blowfish, which can be problematic in the following examples, has not been fully studied.
• Are secrets s5 and s6 also protected in Figure 2b ?
Since they are disconnected in the graph, for their protections, is it necessary to connect them to a null node, or connect them to other nodes (and which)?
• If { , G}-Blowfish privacy is preserved where G is the graph in Figure 2b , what is the privacy guarantee for all the secrets {s1 ∼ s6}, i.e., how to quantify Blowfish privacy in terms of differential privacy?
We will answer above questions in Example 5.3, followed with theoretical result.
Markov Model. Markov model has been studied with differential privacy in existing works. Chatzikokolakis et al. [2] and Fan et al. [10] is necessary to customize privacy protection for personal demands.
We can potentially apply Blowfish privacy in Markov model. For example, Figure 3a shows the Markov model of a moving user with 6 states, denoted by {s1, · · · , s6}. If the user prefers to hide her state in 3 categories, i.e., cafeteria, school and grocery (the octagon, circle and square in Figure 3a) , the privacy customization can be achieved by the graph in Figure 3b . Then if the user is at state s5, the graph ensures that {s4, s5, s6} are indistinguishable.
Unfortunately, the policy graph may be reduced under the temporal correlations in Markov model. For instance, assume the user moved from s1 to s5. If an adversary infers by temporal correlations that the true state can only be {s2, s3, s5}, the shaded area in Figure 3c , is the graph in Figure 3b still applicable? In this case, although s5 is connected to s4 and s6, the adversary can eliminate s4 and s6 with the knowledge (constraint). In consequence, the original edges s4s5 and s5s6 disappear, as shown in Figure 3d . Then the following questions arise: is s5 still protected? If not, how to re-generate a new graph to protect s5 based on the current graph? We will answer these questions in Examples 5.1, 5.2 and 6.1.
Another challenge of directly applying Blowfish privacy is the constraint type. In Blowfish framework, the constraints are deterministic, which leads to the NP-hard complexity [16] . Whereas the constraints in Markov model are probabilistic. For example, in Blowfish framework, Bob can have cancer and diabetes at the same time, or no disease at all. However, in Markov model, there has to and can only exist ONE state, which means the existence of one state excludes all other states. Such rigid constraints pose higher privacy risk than in Blowfish framework.
At last, the long-term privacy protection after releasing a sequence of data should also be considered. For instance, assume the user moved from s1 to s5, and the real sequence is {s1, s2, s5}. If other possible sequences can also be estimated by temporal correlations, like {s1, s4, s5}, {s1, s2, s3}, then what is the long-term protection for the these sequences?
Contributions
First, we propose a rigorous and customizable DPHMM notion by extending the Blowfish privacy [16] . Specifically, we treat every state in Markov model as a node, and construct a graph, in which edges represent "indistinguishability" between the connecting nodes, to represent the privacy policy. In this way, the DPHMM notion guarantees that the true state is always protected in its connecting "neighbors".
Second, we formally analyze the privacy risk under the constraint of temporal correlations. We show that the original graph may be reduced to a subgraph under the constraint, possibly with disconnected nodes. To detect the information leakage of the disconnected nodes, we define sensitivity hull and degree of protection (DoP) based on the graph to capture the protectability of a graph (if a graph is not protectable, then the disconnected nodes will be exposed). We also quantify the overall protection of Blowfish privacy in terms of differential privacy using the sensitivity hull. In addition, we prove that Laplace mechanism [7] is a special case of K-norm mechanism [14] , and provides no better utility than K-norm mechanism.
Third, we develop a data release mechanism to achieve DPHMM. To tackle the detected information leakage, we study how to re-connect the disconnected nodes and find the optimal protectable graph based on the existing graph. We also implement and evaluate the data release mechanism on real-world datasets, showing that privacy and utility can be better tuned with customized policy graph.
Fourth, we thoroughly study the privacy guarantee of DPHMM framework. Besides comparing DPHMM with other privacy notions, we present the privacy composition results when multiple queries were answered over multiple timestamps.
RELATED WORKS

Differential Privacy
While differential privacy [6] has been accepted as a standard notion for privacy protection, most works used Laplace mechanism [7] to release differentially private data. Based on Laplace mechanism, Li et al. proposed Matrix mechanism [20] to answer a batch of queries by factorizing a query matrix to generate a better "strategy" matrix that can replace the original query matrix. Other mechanisms, such as Exponential mechanism [22] and K-Norm mechanism [14] , were also proposed to guarantee differential privacy. We refer readers to [15] for a comparative study of the mechanisms. A variety of differentially private applications [2, 10, 17] can also be found in literature.
Because the concept of standard differential privacy is not generally applicable, several variants or generalizations of differential privacy, such as induced neighbors privacy [18] , have been proposed. Among these variants, Blowfish privacy [16] is the first generic framework with customizable privacy policy. It defines sensitive information as secrets and known knowledge about the data as constraints. By constructing a policy graph, which should also be consistent with all constraints, Blowfish privacy can be formally defined. We extend Blowfish framework to Markov model, and quantify the overall protection of Blowfish privacy in both database context and Markov model.
The lower bound of differentially private query-answering was also investigated. Hardt and Talwar [14] proposed the theoretical lower bound for any differentially private mechanisms. To achieve the lower bound, they also studied KNorm based algorithms to release differentially private data. In the query answering setting, K-Norm mechanism is optimal only when the sensitivity hull [27] is in isotropic position. In this paper, we extend the K-Norm mechanism by investigating the sensitivity hull K in the new setting of DPHMM.
Private Sequential Data
To account for sequential data that changes over time, progresses were made under the assumption that data at different timestamps should be independent. Dwork et al. [8] proposed "user-level" and "event-level" differential privacy to answer count queries on binary bit data. The approach is to use a binary tree technique to amortize Laplace noises to a range of nodes in the tree. Thus the noise magnitude becomes proportional to log(T ) where T is the time period. The same result was also achieved in [1] . Kellaris et al. [17] studied w-event privacy, which protects the continual events in w consecutive timestamps by adjusting the allocation of privacy budget. Overall, above works mainly focused on releasing data independently at each timestamp regardless of temporal correlations.
Temporal correlations were considered with Markov model in several recent works. Several works considered Markov models for improving utility of released location traces or web browsing activities [2, 10] , but did not consider the inference risks when an adversary has the knowledge of the Markov model. Xiao et al.
[27] studied how to protect the true location if a user's movement follows Markov model. The technique can be viewed as a special instantiation of DPHMM for a two-dimensional query (see Theorem 4.1 for details). In addition, DPHMM uses a policy graph to tune the privacy and utility in Markov model.
PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATE-MENT
We denote scalar variables by normal letters, vectors by bold lowercase letters, and matrices by bold capital letters. Superscript x T is the transpose of a vector x; x[i] is the ith element of x. Operators ∪ and ∩ denote union and intersection of sets; | · | denotes the number of elements in a set; || · ||p denotes p norm; ab denotes a line connecting points a and b. Table 1 summarizes some important symbols for convenience.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy protects a database by ensuring that neighboring databases generate similar output. W.l.o.g, we use x ∈ R n to denote a database with n tuples. A query is a function f (x): x → R d that maps x to R d . We use z to denote the answer of a query from a differentially private mechanism. 
≤ e where neighboring databases x1 and x2 satisfies
• (Unbounded DP) x2 can be obtained from x1 by adding or removing a tuple.
• (Bounded DP) x2 can be obtained from x1 by replacing a tuple.
Laplace Mechanism. Laplace mechanism is commonly used in literature. It is built on the 1-norm sensitivity [7] , defined as follows.
where x1 and x2 are any two neighboring databases.
where || · ||1 denotes the 1 norm.
A query can be answered by f (x) + Lap(S f / ) to achieve -differential privacy, where Lap() ∈ R d are i.i.d. random noises drawn from Laplace distribution.
K-norm Mechanism. K-norm, written as || · ||K , is the (Minkowski) norm defined by convex body K (i.e. ||v||K = inf {r > 0 : v ∈ rK}). Given any query f , its sensitivity hull K can be derived [27] . Then a differentially private answer of f can be generated with K-norm mechanism as follows. [14] ). Given any function f and its sensitivity hull K, a mechanism is Knorm mechanism if for any output z, the following holds:
Definition 3.3 (K-norm Mechanism
where f (x * ) is the true answer, Γ() is Gamma function and Vol() denotes volume.
In this paper, we only focus on Laplace mechanism and K-norm mechanism for simplicity. Whereas our framework is applicable to any differentially private perturbation mechanisms.
Blowfish Privacy
Unlike differential privacy which protects all neighboring databases together, Blowfish privacy only protects the connected secrets in its policy graph. Below we only show the definition of Blowfish neighbors. Then Blowfish privacy can be obtained by replacing the neighboring databases x1 and x2 in Definition 3.1 with the following D1 and D2. Definition 3.4 (Blowfish Neighbors [13] ). Given a graph G and a set of constraints C, two databases D1 and D2 are neighbors if they satisfy the constraint C, and
• (Unbounded Blowfish) D2 can be obtained by adding a tuple to or removing a tuple from D1 if the tuple (secret) is connected to a "null" node in G.
• (Bounded Blowfish) D1 and D2 only differ one tuple, whose values in D1 and D2 are connected in G.
We can see that unbounded Blowfish protects the existence of secrets, and bounded Blowfish protects the edges (connected nodes) in the graph.
Hidden Markov Model
We denote the domain of states by S, S = {s1, s2, · · · , sN } where each si is a unit vector with the ith element being 1 and other N − 1 elements being 0. We denote s * the true state at each timestamp. For privacy protection, s * is unobservable to (hidden from) any adversaries. Thus it is an HMM. At timestamp t, we use a vector p t ∈ [0, 1]
1×N to denote the probability distribution of true state. Formally,
is the ith element in p t and si ∈ S. to denote the transition probabilities with mij being the probability of moving from state i to state j. Given probability vector p t−1 , the probability at timestamp t becomes
We will focus on first-order time-homogeneous Markov model in this paper with the understanding that our method can also be extended to high-order or time-heterogeneous Markov model. Measurement Query. At each timestamp, a measurement query f : S → R d about current state is evaluated. We denote the space containing all possible outputs of f by measurement space. where each column corresponds the answer of a state, e.g.
Above answer can be denoted in measurement space, as in Figure 4 (right).
Emission Probabilities. Emission probabilities P r(zt|s * t ) denote the distribution of the observed variable zt. In DPHMM, we design a private data release mechanism to answer the query f with particular emission probabilities, which is the only difference between DPHMM and standard HMM.
Inference and Evolution. At timestamp t, we use p − t and p + t to denote the prior and posterior probabilities of an adversary about current state before and after observing zt respectively. The prior probability can be derived by the (posterior) probability at previous timestamp t − 1 and the Markov transition matrix as p
The posterior probability can be computed using Bayesian inference as follows. For each state si:
The inference of the true state at any timestamp can be efficiently computed by the forward-backward algorithm, which is also incorporated in our data release mechanism. Other standard HMM algorithms can also be directly used in DPHMM.
Problem Statement
Given an initial state (or probability) and a Markov model, our problem is to answer a measurement query f : S → R d at each timestamp under the HMM assumptions. First, the Markov model can be known to any adversaries. Second, all the previously released answers (observable) can be accessed by adversaries to make inference about the true state. Third, the data release mechanism is transparent to adversaries. The released answer zt should have the following properties:
(1) it guarantees a privacy notion to protect the true state; (2) it minimizes the error, measured by the 2 distance between the released answer and the true answer f (s * ):
(3) the privacy-utility trade-off can be customized for various privacy requirements.
Learning the Markov Model. A Markov model can be learned from publicly available data or perturbed personal data using standard methods, such as EM algorithm. Even if an adversary can obtain such a model, we still need to protect the true state. In the DPHMM, we assume the Markov model has been learned, and is also known to any adversaries.
Incomplete Model. Depending on the power of adversaries, an incomplete (inaccurate) Markov model can be used by adversaries. In this case, the privacy is still guaranteed while the inference result may be downgraded for the adversary (Appendix 11.6).
PRIVACY DEFINITION
To derive the meaning of DPHMM, we extend Blowfish privacy from [16, 13] . Related privacy notions are also discussed in this section.
Probabilistic Constraint
A main difference between Blowfish framework and our framework is the constraint type. In Blowfish framework, the constraints are deterministic, which leads to the NPhard complexity [16] . While in Markov model, the constraints are probabilistic. It means the probabilities of states can be known to adversaries. At any timestamp t, the prior probability p − t can be derived as p • For the non-existing states (p − t [i] = 0), the unbounded Blowfish privacy is meaningless. For example, if an adversary knows "Bob does not have cancer", it is not necessary to pretend "Bob might have cancer" any more.
• For the possible states (p
, unbounded Blowfish becomes bounded Blowfish privacy automatically, explained as follows. In the definition of unbounded Blowfish, the neighbors mean si exists or not. When si does not exist, there has to exist another state 1 . Hence it becomes bounded Blowfish neighbors. This is different from traditional Blowfish, in which a database without any secret is still valid.
• Bounded Blowfish privacy only holds for the possible states because all edges connecting the non-existing states disappear in the policy graph.
Without ambiguity, we define the constraint of Markov model as the set of states with p 
In conclusion, we focus on the bounded Blowfish, which means a state is mixed with other states in the graph, under the constraint Ct.
Policy Graph
Policy Graph without Constraint. We first study the problem in the whole domain S without any constraint. Given the true state s * at a timestamp, a user may prefer to hide s * in a group of candidate states, denoted by N (s * ) as neighbors of s * where N (s * ) ⊆ S. Intuitively, the more neighbors a state has, the more privately it is protected. For simplicity, we assume si ∈ N (si) for all states si because it is straightforward that si is hidden in its neighbor set N (si).
We can represent the privacy policy by a undirected graph where a node represents a state and an edge connects an indistinguishable pair of states.
Definition 4.2 (Policy).
A policy is an undirected graph G = (S, E) where S denotes all states (nodes) and E represents indistinguishability (edges) between states. 1 It means the "null" node is invalid in Markov modoel. To better adjust utility and privacy for any particular applications, how to design policy graph is not a trivial task. Below we present a few examples of policy graphs, some of which are from database context [16] . In DPHMM, we assume a policy graph is given.
• Complete protection. To thoroughly protect a sensitive state, we can connect it with all other states. In this way all states are connected and it forms a complete graph, as shown in Figure 5a . However, with higher privacy level comes less utility. Such policy may result in useless output.
G cplt := {G|ss ∈ E, ∀s, s ∈ S}
• Categorical protection. A common method to balance privacy and utility is to partition (or cluster) states into categories. Then every state only needs to be protected in its category. If in a category all states are connected, then the graph becomes disjoint cliques. Figure 5b shows such an example.
• Utility oriented policy. To improve utility, we may consider the policy in the measurement space of query f . Figure 5c shows an example where nodes are only connected if their answers are within r distance ( 2 distance in this example).
where dist() is a distance function in measurement space.
• One-step transition protection. To protect a one-step transition si → sj, we can require all pairs of states sj and s k to be indistinguishable if they can be transited from the same previous state si. For example, if transition probabilities are given in Example 3.1, then Gtrs can be derived as Figure 5d by the following equation.
Gtrs := {G|sjs k ∈ E iff mij > 0 and m ik > 0, ∀i, j, k}
Note that with Gtrs even if s * t were exposed, s * t+1 would still be protected. Hence Gtrs provides strong privacy guarantee.
Policy Graph with Constraint. With the constraint Ct (Definition 4.1), the policy graph G has to be built on Ct at each timestamp t. Then the policy graph becomes a subgraph with the nodes in Ct and the residual edges in G, denoted by constrained policy graph G ∩ Ct. It is intuitive that with different Ct graphs may be different over time.
Example 4.1 (Constrained Policy Graph). Figure  6 shows the policy graphs of Figure 5 with the constraint sets. The black points indicate the constraint sets. The gray points and their edges are removed from the original graph.
DPHMM
With policy graph G and any constraint Ct, { , G, Ct}-DPHMM can be defined as follows with the intuition that at any timestamp the true state cannot be distinguished from its remaining "neighbors" under the constraint.
Definition 4.4 ({ , G, Ct}-DPHMM).
Let G be the policy graph, Ct be the constraint at timestamp t. An { , G, Ct}-DPHMM algorithm A() generates an output zt such that for any zt and any state sj ∈ Ct, the following condition is satisfied:
if sj is disconnected in G ∩ Ct;
In above definition, if sj is connected with any s k in Ct, then sj and s k are indistinguishable by Equation (4); However, if sj is disconnected, sj may be exposed 2 . To protect sj in this case, we have to connect sj to another node s k in Ct (such new graph is called protectable graph in Section 5.2) to form a new edge of indistinguishability between sj and s k . The user has the choice to specify which s k to use to protect sj 3 . We also discuss how to find the optimal s k in Section 6.1.
Comparison with Other Definitions
Among the variant definitions of differential privacy [18, 19, 16 , 27] we briefly compare some closely related definitions as follows.
δ-Location Set based Differential Privacy.
[27] defined differential privacy on a subset of possible states (locations) derived from Markov model. The indistinguishability is ensured among any two locations in the δ-location set, which can be viewed as a new constraint. Thus it is a special case of DPHMM with complete graph.
Theorem 4.1. δ-location set based -differential privacy [27] is equivalent to { , G cplt , C t }-DPHMM where G cplt is a complete graph and
PRIVACY RISK
Given a constrained policy graph G ∩ Ct, when a node si is disconnected (without neighbors), one may conclude that si will be disclosed. However, we show that this may not be the case for Laplace mechanism or K-norm mechanism. The reason is that the perturbation is based on the sensitivity of a query, and the sensitivity may implicitly protect si with other nodes. In this section, we formalize the intuition, and define sensitivity hull and degree of protection (DoP) based on the constrained policy graph to analyze the privacy risk. We also analyze the overall protection of Blowfish privacy with the sensitivity hull.
Sensitivity Hull
It has been shown that the standard 1-norm sensitivity (in Definition 3.2) exaggerates the sensitivity of differential privacy [27] . To capture the real sensitivity, we define sensitivity hull of graph G and query f using convex hull, denoted by Conv(). Intuitively, it measures the "maximum" differences of the query results on each pair of connected states (edges in the graph).
Definition 5.1 (Sensitivity Hull). Given a graph G = (S, E), the sensitivity hull of a query f is the convex hull of ∆f where ∆f is the set of f (sj)−f (s k ) for any connected nodes sj and s k in G.
Without ambiguity, ∆f can also be denoted by a matrix in R d×2m where each column is a point of f (sj) − f (s k ) and m = |E| is the number of edges in G. We show an example as follows.
Example 5.1 (Sensitivity Hull). Given the query in Example 3.2 and the graph in Figure 3b , Figure 7a shows the policy graph without constraint in measurement space. The 1-norm sensitivity (Definition 5.1 in [16] ) is 5 because ||f (s4) − f (s5)||1 = 5. The dashed lines and solid lines show the 1-norm sensitivity and sensitivity hull with the following ∆f in Figure 7b respectively. Each column in ∆f denotes the query difference of two states, e.g., the first column We skip the computation details because Conv() has been well studied in computational geometry. Figure 7b , 1-norm sensitivity is bigger than sensitivity hull. Following this, we can further prove that Laplace mechanism is a special case of Knorm mechanism and provides no better utility than Knorm mechanism. Thus we use K-norm mechanism as a unifying mechanism in the following analysis of this paper.
Discussion. As shown in
Theorem 5.1. Laplace mechanism is a special case of Knorm mechanism when K = K S f where K S f is the cross polytope {x ∈ R d : ||x||1 ≤ S f } and S f is the 1-norm sensitivity of f .
Corollary 5.1. Laplace mechanism provides no better utility than K-norm mechanism because K S f always contains sensitivity hull K.
Privacy Risk
Under constraint, connectivity of policy graph is destructed. In the following example, we show that directly using existing data release methods may lead to exposure of disconnected nodes. Figure 3b , assume at a timestamp t, the constraint set Ct = {s2, s3, s5}. Then the constrained graph is shown in Figure 8 (left). We use existing mechanisms, including Laplace based mechanisms and K-norm based mechanisms, to answer the query in Example 3.2. Laplace based Mechanisms. The 1-norm sensitivity S f = 2. W.l.o.g., assume the released answer z = f (s5). Then for a Laplace mechanism A(),
Example 5.2 (Information Exposure). Given the query in Example 3.2 and the graph in
> e . Hence s5 is distinct from s2 and s3. Consequently, if f (s5) is far from f (s2) and f (s3), then s5 will be exposed. K-norm based Mechanisms. Sensitivity hull of the query f is Conv(f (s2) − f (s3), f (s3) − f (s2)) where Conv() is the function of deriving convex hull. For a K-norm based mechanism A(), it means A(s2) and A(s3) are on the line of f (s2)f (s3) (dashed line through f (s2) and f (s3) in Figure 8 (right)); A(s5) is on the dashed line through f (s5) in Figure  8 (right). Again we assume the released result z = f (s5). Then P r(A(s3) = f (s5)) = 0. Clearly, any z not on the line of f (s2)f (s3) leads to complete exposure of s5.
Intuitively, given a disconnected node si in the constrained set Ct, if there exists another node sj ∈ Ct such that the difference f (si) − f (sj) is contained in the sensitivity hull K, then si is protected by sj. Otherwise, if no such node sj exists, then si is exposed. Therefore, privacy risk can be measured by sensitivity hull K as follows. If there is no sj such that f (sj) ∈ f (si) + K, then si is exposed, meaning that Equation (4) will not hold. To capture such geometric meaning (i.e., f (sj) − f (si) ∈ K), we define degree of protection.
Definition 5.2 (DoP).
At any timestamp t, the degree of protection ( DoP) of a state si is the number of states contained in f (si) + Kt where Kt is the sensitivity hull. DoP(si, Kt) = |{sj|f (sj) ∈ f (si) + Kt, sj ∈ Ct}| Because f (si) is always in f (si) + K, DoP(si, K) ≥ 1 for all si ∈ Ct. Note that not all disconnected nodes are exposed. For example, in Figure 9a , s2 is disconnected under constraint Ct = {s2, s4, s5, s6}. However, DoP(s2) = 3 since f (s2) + K contains f (s4) and f (s5).
If all the nodes of a graph have DoP > 1, we say it is protectable. Note that a complete graph is always protectable because every two nodes are connected. Computation. The computation of protectability (i.e. DoP) is to check the number of f (sj) inside a convex body f (si) + K for all sj ∈ Ct. Because the problem of checking whether a point is a convex body has been well studied in computational geometry, we skip the discussion of details. 4 Letñ ∈ R 2 be 2 i.i.d Laplace noises with mean 0 and variance 1. Then Lap(S f / ) = S f ñ is the Laplace noises added to the query.
).
Blowfish Analysis
We now use the technique of sensitivity hull to analyze the protection of Blowfish privacy.
Example 5.3 (Information Exposure).
Given the table T in Figure 2a and the graph in Figure 2b , let f be a two-dimensional query:
f1 : select count(*) from T where disease="cancer" . Then the sensitivity hull can be derived. Assume { , G}-Blowfish privacy is preserved where G is the graph in Figure 2b . Then secret s5 is protected with both Laplace mechanism and K-norm mechanism; while secret s6 is protected only by Laplace mechanism, not by Knorm mechanism. It can be proven that with K-norm mechanism the unbounded differential privacies for the existences of {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} are { , 0, , 2 , , 2 } respectively (e.g.
≤ e 2 ). Thus it is 2 -unbounded-DP in total.
This also illustrates why we need to re-design a new optimal graph with less privacy loss in Section 6.1. Note that (1) the original bounded Blowfish privacy (i.e. the graph in Figure  2b ) does not protect s6 in the first place. Hence the original Blowfish privacy still holds; (2) although s4 is connected with s3, the existence of s4 is also at risk (2 -DP); (3) although s6 is not connected with s4, it is indistinguishable with s4 by default. Quantifying Blowfish. We quantify the overall protection of Blowfish as follows. First, it is intuitive that bounded Blowfish is weaker than (or equal to) bounded DP, and unbounded Blowfish is also weaker than (or equal to) unbounded DP. For lack of space, below we quantify the protection of bounded Blowfish in terms of unbounded DP with Knorm mechanism. It can be easily extended to other cases.
Definition 5.4 ({ , G, C}-ConstrainedDP).
Let G = (S, E) be the policy graph in Blowfish privacy, and C be the instances satisfying the constraint in either Markov model or database context. A randomized mechanism A() satisfies { , G, C}-constrained differential privacy if for any output z, one of the following condition holds:
(1). in Markov model,
≤ e , ∀sj, s k ∈ C; (2). in database context,
≤ e , ∀D1, D2, ∈ C, D1 can be obtained by adding si to or removing si from D2, si ∈ S.
Note that in Markov model, above definition is actually bounded DP because unbound DP becomes bounded DP by nature (Section 4.1).
Theorem 5.3 (Blowfish Protection).
Let G be the policy graph, and C be the instances satisfying the constraint
(e) Ct = {s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 } Figure 9 : in Blowfish privacy. With K-norm mechanism, if { , {S, G, C}}-Blowfish privacy holds, then it satisfies (1) . max
. max
context, where K is the sensitivity hull of query f .
DATA RELEASE MECHANISM
If privacy risk is detected, we build a protectable graph as a supergraph of existing graph 5 . In this section, we first formulate the problem of building a minimum protectable graph with lowest error bound. Next we show that this problem is #P-hard, and propose a fast greedy algorithm. Then we present the data release mechanism.
Minimum Protectable Graph
It is clear that a protectable graph satisfies the DPHMM condition in Definition 4.4. Therefore, when information is exposed, we need to build a protectable graph by reconnecting the disconnected nodes so that they have DoP > 1. Next we formulate the problem of building a minimum protectable graph and investigate its computational complexity, then propose a greedy algorithm to this end.
Minimum Protectable Graph. Because the error bound of differential privacy is determined by the volume of sensitivity hull K(Gt) [14] where Gt is the graph under constraint at timestamp t, the optimal graph should have the minimum volume of K(Gt) for best utility. We define the optimal graph as follows.
Given the policy graph G and the constraint set Ct at timestamp t, the optimal graph Gt is a graph containing G ∩ Ct with minimum volume K( Gt) under the DPHMM condition (Definition 4.4):
5 On the other hand, since the policy graph is customizable to users, the protectable graph can also be created by users. In this case, it is not necessary to derive another minimum protectable graph again.
Gt satisfies the DPHMM condition Example 6.1 (Minimum Protectable Graph). Given the query in Example 3.2 and the graph in Figure 3b , Figure 9b shows the graph under constraint Ct = {s3, s4, s5, s6}. Then s3 is exposed because f (s3)+K contains no other node. To satisfy the DPHMM condition, we need to connect s3 to another node in Ct, i.e. s4, s5 or s6.
If s3 is connected to s4, then Figure 9c shows the new graph and its sensitivity hull. By adding two new edges {f (s3) − f (s4), f (s4) − f (s3)} to ∆f , the shaded areas are attached to the sensitivity hull. Similarly, Figures 9d and 9e show the new sensitivity hulls when s3 is connected to s6 and s5 respectively. Because the smallest Area(K) is in Figure  9c , the optimal graph Gt is G ∩ Ct ∪ s3s4.
Complexity. We can see that to derive the optimal graph, minimum volume Vol(K) should be computed. For any query f : S → R d , K is a polytope in R d . However, the volume computation of polytope is #P-hard [9] . Thus it follows that the computation of minimum volume is no easier than #P-hard 6 .
Theorem 6.1. The problem of minimum protectable graph in Equation (5) is #P-hard.
Greedy Algorithm. Due to the computational complexity, we propose a greedy algorithm similar to minimum spanning tree. The idea is to connect each disconnected node to its nearest (in measurement space) node. For other theoretical algorithms of volume computation with polynomial time bound, please see [26] . Algorithm 1 shows the greedy algorithm, which takes O(N 2 ) time where N = |V| is the number of nodes.
Data Release Mechanism
The data release mechanism is shown in Algorithm 2. At each timestamp t, we compute the prior probability vector
Algorithm 1 Protectable Graph
Require: G, Ct, f 1: Gt ← G ∩ Ct; 2: for all exposed node si ∈ Ct do 3:
4:
Gt ← Gt ∪ sisj;
connect to nearest node 5: end for 6: return protectable graph Gt;
Under the constraint Ct, the graph G becomes a subgraph G ∩ Ct. To satisfy the DPHMM condition, we derive a protectable graph Gt by Algorithm 1. Next a differentially private mechanism can be adopted to release a perturbed answer zt. Then the released zt will also be used to update the posterior probability p + t (in the equation below) by Equation (2), which subsequently will be used to compute the prior probability for the next timestamp t + 1.
Note that in line 4 zt can be released by either Laplace mechanism or K-norm mechanism. For simplicity, we use K-norm mechanism as a unifying mechanism (Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 6.2. Given policy graph G and query f , Algorithm 2 satisfies { , G, Ct}-DPHMM at any timestamp. Theorem 6.3. Given policy graph G and query f , at any timestamp t, Algorithm 2 satisfies
where Ct is the constraint, Kt is the sensitivity hull of query f and protectable graph Gt.
PRIVACY COMPOSITION
In some cases, multiple queries need to be answered. Thus we analyze the privacy composition for multiple data releases. Note that the parallel composition [21] is not applicable because there is only one state in Markov model.
Single-Time Multiple-Queries. At one timestamp, it is possible that many queries should be answered. Then the privacy cost composes for all queries.
Theorem 7.1. At timestamp t, an { , G, Ct}-DPHMM mechanism released multiple answers z1, z2, · · · , zn for queries f1, f2, · · · , fn with 1, 2, · · · , n, then it satisfies { n i=1 i, G, Ct}-DPHMM and
constrainedDP where Ki denotes the sensitivity hull of fi.
Multiple-Time Single-Query. If a query was answered over multiple timestamps, then the privacy protection has to be enforced on the sequence. Under the probabilistic constraint, we define differentially private sequence with all possible sequences. Definition 7.1. A constraint set of sequences Q = {Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q n } is a set of n possible sequences with P r(Q i ) > 0 for all Q i ∈ S t , i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Definition 7.2 ({ , Q}-ConstrainedDPS). During timestamps 1, 2, · · · , t in an HMM, a randomized mechanism A() generates { , Q}-ConstrainedDPS if for any output sequence z1, z2, · · · , zt and any possible sequences Q j and Q k in Q, the following holds
Theorem 7.2. During timestamps i = 1, 2, · · · , t in an { i, G, Ci}-DPHMM with policy graph G and constraints Ci = {Q j [i]|∀Q j ∈ Q}, the released sequence z1, z2, · · · , zt for a query f satisfies
constrainedDPS where Ki denotes the sensitivity hull at timestamp i.
Above compositions can be combined for the case of multipletime and multiple-queries data releases. This completes our analysis of privacy composition over time.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We report the experimental evaluation in this section. All algorithms were implemented in Matlab on a PC with 2.4GHz CPU and 4GB memory.
Datasets. We used the following two datasets with similar configurations in [27] for comparison purpose. The Markov models were learned from the raw data. From each dataset, 20 sequences, each of which contains 100 timestamps, were selected for our experiment. Then the average result is reported.
• Geolife dataset. Geolife dataset [28] recorded a wide range of users' outdoor movements, represented by a series of tuples containing latitude, longitude and timestamp. We extracted all the trajectories within the 3rd ring of Beijing to learn the Markov model, with the map partitioned into cells of 0.34 × 0.34 km 2 .
• Gowalla dataset. Gowalla dataset [4] Mechanisms. For better utility, we used the planar isotropic mechanism in [27] (with δ = 0.01) to release the locations of users. We denote our privacy notion and [27] by DPMM and DPLS 7 respectively. Because Laplace mechanism provides no better utility than K-norm based mechanism, proved in Corollary 5.1, we skipped the evaluation of Laplace mechanism. The default value of is 1 if not mentioned. 7 Differential privacy on location set. Application. For location data, a common application is to release the location coordinates. Thus we use the measurement query f : S → R 2 that returns a 2 × 1 vector of longitude and latitude.
Two policy graphs were adopted in our experiments: utilityoriented G util and privacy-oriented Gtrs, as defined in Section 4.2.
• G util connects all nodes if their distances of locations are less than r;
• Gtrs guarantees that even if the previous states were completely exposed, privacy can still be protected in the current timestamp.
Because of different customizations of the two graphs, we can examine the different results of them. In G util , the default values of r for GeoLife and Gowalla are 1(km) and 2(km) respectively.
Metrics. We used the following metrics in our experiment.
• To measure the efficiency, the runtime of data release method was evaluated.
• DoP represents the number of nodes that a node is hidden in. Hence to reflect the privacy level of true states, DoP of true states was computed.
• The utility of DPHMM was measured by Error = ||zt −f (s * t )||2 where zt is the released answer and f (s * t ) is the true answer. Figure 10 shows the runtime report on the two datasets. We can see that the runtime of DPHMM, either with G util or Gtrs, is a little bit longer than DPLS. The reason is that DPLS uses a tighter constraint than Ct, which in our setting became numerous when Markov model converged to a stationary distribution gradually. Then the computation of sensitivity hull took more time with larger graph. It is also worth noting that sensitivity hull converges with Ct. As time evolves, the runtime also converges with Markov model to a stable level.
Runtime
Performance over Time
At each timestamp, the (smoothed) DoP and Error are shown in Figure 11 . As expected, Gtrs provides the strongest protection of privacy, while G util has the lowest error on both datasets. With Gtrs, the true state was protected in a set of 100 and 70 possible states for the two datasets. Provided such strong protection, the error also rises. With G util , the query error was smaller than DPLS yet the DoP was even larger than DPLS. Therefore, we can infer that customizable graph provides better trade-off between privacy and utility.
Impact of Parameters
We also measure the average performance over the 100 timestamps with different parameters. Impact of . Figure 12 reports the impact of . From  Figures 12a and 12b , DoP stays the same with different because the size of Ct does not change with . Again we see that Gtrs provides the largest DoP with little sacrifice of utility, compared with DPLS. Figures 12c and 12d verifies that the larger , the smaller Error, which is easy to under- stand because determines the shape of noise distribution. Impact of r. To better understand the trade-off between privacy and utility with different graphs, we also tested the performance with different G util (r) where r is the distance parameter in measurement space, as defined in Section 4.2 8 . Intuitively, with larger r comes stronger protection, which is confirmed in Figures 13a and 13b . However, the Error of DPHMM is still lower than DPLS in most results, although it is expected that Error grows with bigger r. Therefore, we can conclude that with different policy graph privacy and utility can be better tuned in different scenarios.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we proposed DPHMM by embedding a differentially private data release mechanism in hidden Markov model. DPHMM guarantees that the true state in Markov model at every timestamp is protected by a customizable policy graph. Under the temporal correlations, the graph may be reduced to subgraphs. Thus we studied the consequential privacy risk by introducing the notion of protectable graph based on the sensitivity hull and degree of protection. To prevent information exposure we studied how to build an optimal protectable graph based on the current graph. The privacy guarantee of DPHMM has also been thoroughly investigated, by comparing it with other privacy notions and studying the composition results over multiple queries and timestamps.
DPHMM can be used in a variety of applications to release private data for purposes like data mining or social studies. Future works can also study how to efficiently design and implement the policy graph for various privacy requirements.
[27] Y. Xiao and L. Xiong. 11. APPENDIX
Laplace Mechanism
From the view point of K-norm mechanism, we can prove the following statements:
1. Laplace mechanism is a special case of K-norm mechanism.
2. Laplace mechanism is optimal in one-dimensional space.
3. The 1-norm sensitivity of Laplace mechanism contains sensitivity hull. Therefore, Laplace mechanism is not optimal in multidimensional space.
For standard Laplace mechanism, the answer for query workload F ∈ R d×N [7] is
where S F is the 1-norm sensitivity of F andñ ∈ R d are i.i.d variables from standard Laplace distribution with mean 0 and variance 1. Theorem 11.1. Let fz(z) be the probability distribution of z from standard Laplace mechanism. Then
Theorem 11.2. Let K r be the cross polytope {x ∈ R d : ||x||1 ≤ r}. Standard Laplace mechanism is a special case of K-norm mechanism when K = K S F .
Proof. In Equation (1), let K = K S F . Then Vol(K S F ) = From Theorem 5.1, Statement 1 is true because K = K S F in K-norm mechanism; Statement 2 is true because K is isotropic (up to a constant) in one-dimensional space; Statement 3 is true because K S F contains the sensitivity hull.
Details in Example 5.3
We explain the computation details in Example 5.3.
Example 11.1. W.l.o.g, for a database D we assume the answer to the query in Example 5.3 is f (D) = [10, 20] T . Then f (D ∪ s1) = [11, 20] T , f (D ∪ s2) = [10, 20] T , f (D ∪ s3) = [11, 20] T , f (D ∪ s4) = [10, 21] T . Given the graph in T is not in K, it is not protected by K-norm mechanism. W.l.o.g, assume z = [10, 21] T . Letñ be the noise injected by K-norm mechanism. . Hence the unbounded DP for s6 is 2 . Similarly, the unbounded DP for {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} are { , 0, , 2 , , 2 } respectively. Overall, it is 2 -unbounded-DP. 
Minimum Protectable Graph in 2-Dimensional Space
It is possible to design fast algorithms in low dimensional space to derive the minimum protectable graph. We propose a fast algorithm in 2-dimensional space.
In 2-dimensional space, it only takes O(mlog(m)) time to find a convex hull where m = |E| is the number of edges. Thus we can connect the disconnected node si to the rest (at most 2m) nodes, generating at most 2m convex hulls. We
det(vi, vj) to derive the area of a convex hull with clockwise nodes v1, v2, · · · , v h where h is the number of vertices and v h+1 = v1. By comparing the area of these convex hulls, we can find the smallest area in O(nm 3 ) time where n is the number of exposed nodes.
Theorem 11.3. Algorithm 3 takes O(nm 3 ) time where m = |E| is the number of edges and n is the number of exposed nodes.
Computing Degree of Protection
The computation of DoP is to check the number of f (sj) inside a convex body f (si) + K for all sj ∈ Ct. The problem of checking whether a point is a convex body has been
